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INTRODUCTION 
The Roberts Court will likely be remembered for its decision to 
uphold the Affordable Care Act, its same-sex marriage-rulings, and its 
decisions in First Amendment and corporate-speech cases; but this 
Court should also be remembered for ushering in the era of digital 
Fourth Amendment rights. The Court has not only addressed how 
Fourth Amendment standards will apply to changing communications 
technologies, it has also gone out of its way to learn and understand 
how new technologies will affect the balance of power between the 
government and citizens. We have come a long way from Chief Justice 
Roberts’ question during oral argument in City of Ontario, California 
v. Quon: “[M]aybe everyone else knows this, but what is the difference 
between a pager and e-mail?”1 
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 1.  Transcript of Oral Argument at 29, City of Ontario, Ca. v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746 (2010) 
(No. 08-1332). We have also moved past the arguments about a “tiny constable” in Justices 
Scalia’s majority opinion and Justice Alito’s concurring opinion in United States v. Jones, 132 S. 
Ct. 945, 958 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring) (arguing that late-18th-century situations are not 
analogous to modern cases and rejecting Justice Scalia’s contention that it might have been 
possible to “imagine a case in which a constable secreted himself somewhere in a coach and 
remained there for a period of time in order to monitor the movements of the coach’s owner,” 
quibbling that “this would have required either a gigantic coach, a very tiny constable, or 
both”). 
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In Riley v. California2 the Court answered—in a unanimous, nine-
to-zero decision—the question of whether the police must obtain a 
warrant prior to searching an individual’s cell phone incident to a 
lawful arrest.  The Court said, simply and unequivocally, yes, “get a 
warrant.”3  Moreover, the Court directly addressed the impact of ever-
expanding digital storage, the proliferation of smartphones, and the 
implications of encryption and access to cloud-based services. The 
opinion reflected the Court’s newfound understanding of modern 
communications technologies and their impact on civil rights. It stands 
as one of the strongest and clearest proclamations of Fourth 
Amendment rights in the Court’s history. 
This article will explore the implications of the Riley decision on 
future Fourth Amendment cases, including cases challenging the bulk 
collection of telephone metadata. The article will review the 
background of Riley and the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine, and 
describe the new categorical rule adopted by the Court. The article 
will then consider how the Riley decision will affect lower court 
rulings on important Fourth Amendment issues: the scope of the 
search-incident-to-arrest and border-search exceptions, whether the 
collection of metadata and location information is a search, and the 
rules governing seizure of electronic records. 
I.  THE COURT’S DECISION IN RILEY 
On June 25, 2014, the Supreme Court issued a unanimous opinion 
in companion cases Riley v. California and United States v. Wurie, 
written by Chief Justice Roberts with a concurring opinion by Justice 
Alito. Both cases presented the question of whether “the police may, 
without a warrant, search digital information on a cell phone seized 
from an individual who has been arrested.”4 The Court ultimately held 
that the warrantless search of a cell phone seized during a lawful 
arrest was unreasonable and violated the Fourth Amendment. 
The two cases arose from slightly different factual circumstances. 
In Riley v. California, the defendant, David Leon Riley, was arrested 
for “possession of concealed and loaded firearms” in his car, 
uncovered by police during a traffic stop.5 Riley was searched incident 
to the arrest and officers seized several items in his possession, 
 
  2.  134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014).   
 3.  Id. at 2495. 
 4.  Id. at 2480. 
 5.  Id.  
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including the cell phone in his pocket.6 Both sides agreed that Riley’s 
phone was a “smart phone.”7 A detective later “went through” the 
defendant’s cell phone at the police station “looking for evidence” of 
gang-related activity.8 Several videos and photographs from the phone 
were introduced as evidence in a criminal case about an unrelated 
shooting that took place several weeks earlier.9 Specifically, the State 
of California introduced photos and videos taken from the phone as 
evidence that Riley “committed those crimes for the benefit of a 
criminal street gang, an aggravating factor that carries an enhanced 
sentence.”10 
Riley moved to suppress the evidence obtained from his cell 
phone, arguing that it was the fruit of an unreasonable warrantless 
search that violated his Fourth Amendment rights.11 The trial court 
denied his motion to suppress, and he was subsequently convicted. 
The California Court of Appeals affirmed the decision, relying on a 
recent opinion, People v. Diaz,12 from the California Supreme Court, 
which had held that an officer could search an arrestee’s cell phone 
incident to arrest if the phone was “immediately associated with the 
arrestee’s person.”13 Riley petitioned for review by the California 
Supreme Court, which was denied, and he subsequently filed a 
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, 
which was granted on January 17, 2014.14 
In United States v. Wurie, the defendant, Brima  
Wurie, was arrested after a police officer observed him making “an 
apparent drug sale from a car.”15 The officers later seized two cell 
phones from Wurie at the police station.16 The phone at issue was a 
“flip phone” and thus did not have the same advanced capabilities as 
the smart phone at issue in Riley.17 After the officers seized Wurie’s 
phone, they noticed that it was receiving numerous calls from a 
 
 6.  Id. 
 7.  The Court defined this as “a cell phone with a broad range of other functions based on 
advanced computing capability, large storage capacity, and Internet connectivity.” Id. 
 8.  Id. at 2480–81. 
 9.  Id. at 2481. 
 10.  Id. 
 11.  Id. 
 12.  244 P.3d 501 (Cal. 2011). 
 13.  Id. at 93. 
 14.  134 S. Ct. 999 (2014) (granting certiorari). 
 15.  Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2481. Both Riley and Wurie were decided in the same opinion here 
denominated simply as “Riley v. California.” 
 16.  Id. 
 17.  Id. 
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contact labeled “my home” according to the external call indicator.18 
The officers opened the phone and went through the call logs and 
contacts in order to identify the phone number designated as “my 
home.”19 They also saw a photograph of “a woman and a baby set as 
the phone’s wallpaper.”20 Using an online directory, the officers were 
able to use the phone number to obtain Wurie’s address.21 Based on 
that address, officers obtained a warrant to search his apartment, 
where they discovered drugs, paraphernalia, cash, a firearm, and 
ammunition.22 
Wurie was charged with drug and firearm-related crimes, but he 
moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that it was the “fruit of an 
unconstitutional search of his cell phone.”23 The district court denied 
his motion and he was later convicted.24 A divided panel of the United 
States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit subsequently reversed 
the trial court decision, finding that cell phones are “distinct from 
other physical possessions that may be searched incident to arrest 
without a warrant.”25 The United States filed a Petition for a Writ of 
Certiorari, which was granted, along with the Petition in Riley, on 
January 17, 2014.26 
A.  The Search-Incident-to-Arrest Exception 
As the Court noted at the outset, the “ultimate touchstone of the 
Fourth Amendment is ‘reasonableness.’”27 Under the reasonableness 
standard, a search “undertaken by law enforcement officials to 
discover evidence of criminal wrongdoing” generally requires “the 
obtaining of a judicial warrant.”28 A warrantless search is only 
reasonable “if it falls within a specific exception to the warrant 
requirement.”29 One such exception is a search “of the accused when 
legally arrested to discover and seize the fruits or evidences of 
 
 18.  Id. 
 19.  Id. 
 20.  Id. 
 21.  Id. 
 22.  Id. 
 23.  Id. at 2482. 
 24.  Id. 
 25.  Id. 
 26.  134 S. Ct. 999 (2014) (granting certiorari). 
 27.  Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2482 (quoting Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 
(2006)). 
 28.  Id. (quoting Veronia School Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 653 (1995)). 
 29.  Id. 
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crime.”30 
The Court’s decision in Riley is the most recent in a long line of 
cases outlining the boundaries of the search-incident-to-arrest 
exception. The Court previously established the boundaries of this 
exception in three cases: Chimel v. California,31 United States v. 
Robinson,32 and Arizona v. Gant.33 In Chimel, the Court held that 
there was “ample justification . . . for a search of the arrestee’s person 
and the area ‘within his immediate control’—construing that phrase 
to mean the area from within which he might gain possession of a 
weapon or destructible evidence.”34 The justification for this exception 
was twofold: (1) to protect the arresting officer and prevent escape, 
and (2) to prevent the concealment or destruction of evidence.35 
The Court later clarified this rule in Robinson, finding that the 
physical inspection of an object discovered during the search of the 
arrestee’s person is permissible, regardless of “the probability in a 
particular arrest situation that weapons or evidence would in fact be 
found upon the person of the suspect.”36 As the Court noted in 
Robinson, this rule was largely pragmatic: “A police officer’s 
determination as to how and where to search the person of a suspect 
whom he has arrested is necessarily a quick ad hoc judgment which 
the Fourth Amendment does not require to be broken down in each 
instance into an analysis of each step in the search.”37 For more than 
twenty years after Robinson, lower courts applied few limitations on 
the scope of searches within the “zone of immediate control” of an 
arrestee.38 Then in Gant, the Court applied the Chimel rule to the 
search of a vehicle and found that police could search a vehicle under 
the exception “only when the arrestee is unsecured and within 
reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the 
search.”39 However, the Court found that a separate exception would 
 
 30.  Id. (quoting Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1913)). 
 31.  395 U.S. 752 (1969). 
 32.  414 U.S. 218 (1973). 
 33.  556 U.S. 332 (2009). 
 34.  Chimel, 395 U.S. at 762–63. 
 35.  Id. 
 36.  Robinson, 414 U.S. at 235.  
 37.  Id. 
 38.  The Court clarified in Chadwick that the Robinson rule did not apply to physical 
containers that were not “immediately associated with the person of the arrestee.” United 
States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 15 (1977) (holding a locked footlocker could not be searched 
incident to arrest). 
 39.  Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 343 (2009). 
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allow for the search of a vehicle “when it is ‘reasonable to believe 
evidence related to the crime of arrest might be found in the 
vehicle.’”40 
Prior to Riley, lower courts applying the Chimel and Robinson 
rules were split over whether the exception permitted officers to 
search photos, call logs, messages, and other data stored on a cell 
phone. Some courts viewed this as a straightforward application of 
Robinson—any phone found within the arrestee’s zone of control 
could be searched and inspected without further justification.41 But 
other courts disagreed, finding that the Chimel justifications were not 
applicable to the search of digital files stored on a cell phone—those 
files did not pose a threat to the officer and there was no risk of loss 
of evidence once the phone had been secured.42 The Court in Riley 
was faced with a clear question: should modern cell phones be treated 
differently than other objects in the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine 
and, if so, why? 
B.  The New Digital Rule 
The Court’s unanimous opinion in Riley answered the narrow 
question as clearly and forcefully as possible: yes, cell phones must be 
subject to different rules than other physical objects within the 
search-incident-to-arrest exception.43 Whereas the default rule for 
inspection of physical objects under Robinson had been that no 
warrant is required for a physical search incident to arrest,44 the 
default rule for searches of cell phones under Riley is “get a 
warrant.”45 But what is most interesting about Riley is the Court’s 
 
 40.  Id. (citing Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 632 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring in 
the judgment)). 
 41.  Three courts prior to Riley had held that cell phone searches incident to arrest were 
categorically permitted under the Robinson rule. See United States v. Murphy, 552 F.3d 405, 
411–12 (4th Cir. 2009); United States v. Finley, 477 F.3d 250, 259–60 (5th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 
549 U.S. 1353 (2007); People v. Diaz, 244 P.3d 501, 510 (Cal. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 94 
(2011). Three other courts had ruled that certain files on a cell phone could be searched incident 
to arrest, without reaching the question of whether other types of files could be subject to 
search. See United States v. Flores-Lopez, 670 F.3d 803 (7th Cir. 2012) (search to obtain the 
phone number of the seized cell phone); Commonwealth v. Phifer, 979 N.E.2d 210, 216 (Mass. 
2012) (search of recent call list); Hawkins v. State, 723 S.E.2d 924, 926 (Ga. 2012) (search of text 
messages limited in scope). 
 42.  See, e.g., United States v. Wurie, 728 F.3d 1, 11 (1st Cir. 2013); Smallwood v. State, 113 
So. 3d 724, 735–36 (Fla. 2013); State v. Smith, 920 N.E.2d 949, 956 (Ohio 2009), cert. denied, 131 
S. Ct. 102 (2010).  
 43.  Riley, 134 S.Ct. at 2490–91. 
 44.  Robinson, 414 U.S. at 235. 
 45.  Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2495. 
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clear articulation of the important differences between Fourth 
Amendment protections for digital devices, as opposed to physical 
objects, because this reasoning will likely be applied to evaluating 
searches affecting a wide range of new technologies. 
At the outset, the Court acknowledged that the application of the 
search-incident-to-arrest doctrine to cell phones is significant because 
these devices “are now such a pervasive and insistent part of daily life 
that the proverbial visitor from Mars might conclude they were an 
important feature of human anatomy.”46 The Court went on to 
recognize the evolution and widespread adoption of cell phones and 
more sophisticated smartphones that are “based on technology nearly 
inconceivable just a few decades ago, when Chimel and Robinson 
were decided.”47 
As a result of these technological changes, the Court found it 
necessary to evaluate the cell phone search issue as a possible new 
exception to the warrant requirement. Rather than applying 
Robertson directly, the Court approached the issue “by assessing, on 
the one hand, the degree to which it intrudes upon an individual’s 
privacy and, on the other, the degree to which it is needed for the 
promotion of legitimate governmental interests.”48 As the Court 
noted, the balancing of interests in Robinson favored a “categorical 
rule” exempting all physical searches conducted incident to arrest, but 
“neither of its rationales has much force with respect to digital 
content on cell phones.”49 The Court proceeded to describe the key 
difference between the physical and digital search cases: “Cell phones, 
however, place vast quantities of personal information literally in the 
hands of individuals. A search of information on a cell phone bears 
little resemblance to the type of brief physical search considered in 
Robinson.”50 
 
 
 
 46.  Id. at 2484. 
 47.  Id. This is a key point: the Court’s old precedents, adopted prior to the development of 
this new technology, are not directly applicable to the current situation. 
 48.  Id. (quoting Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300 (1999)). 
 49.  Id. Specifically, the Court was not convinced that, absent an immediate, warrantless 
search of cell-phone content, that officer safety would be threatened, or that digital evidence 
would be destroyed. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2485–88. 
 50.  Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2485. 
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C.  Strong Privacy Interests in Digital Data 
After reviewing the governmental interests at stake in the search-
incident-to-arrest context, the Court went on to consider the privacy 
interests at stake when officers search an arrestee’s cell phone.51 The 
Court found that cell phones are different “both in a quantitative and 
a qualitative sense from other objects that might be kept on an 
arrestee’s person.”52 The Court also recognized that most modern 
devices “are in fact minicomputers that also happen to have the 
capacity to be used as a telephone.”53 In sum, the “immense storage 
capacity” of the devices combined with their multifunctional nature 
fundamentally alters the privacy interests at stake. This portion of the 
Court’s opinion in Riley, more than any other, will likely be 
remembered as a foundational invocation of digital Fourth 
Amendment rights. 
To support its conclusion that digital devices are fundamentally 
different than physical objects, the Court first addressed the practical 
limits of physical searches. Those searches had traditionally been 
“limited by physical realities and tended as a general matter to 
constitute only a narrow intrusion on privacy.”54 But unlike physical 
containers, cell phones can contain “millions of pages of text, 
thousands of pictures, and hundreds of videos.”55 Phones can also 
store unique data, such as internet browsing history, that never exists 
in physical form. The Court also predicted that “this gulf between 
physical practicability and digital capacity will only continue to widen 
in the future.”56 
The Court went on to address the “interrelated consequences for 
privacy” of the increasing storage capacity of mobile devices.57 The 
Court found it significant that increased storage capacity enables the 
consolidation of many different types of information, which could 
“reveal much more in combination than any isolated record.”58 The 
Court also noted that the aggregation of photos or other files, along 
 
 51.  See id. at 2489 (noting that “[a] conclusion that inspecting the contents of an arrestee’s 
pockets works no substantial additional intrusion on privacy beyond the arrest itself may make 
sense as applied to physical items, but any extension of that reasoning to digital data has to rest 
on its own bottom”). 
 52.  Id. 
 53.  Id. 
 54.  Id. 
 55.  Id. 
 56.  Id. 
 57.  Id. 
 58.  Id. 
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with timestamps and associated metadata, would reveal a great deal 
more than individual physical items ever could.59 Similarly, the 
archival nature of stored data, providing a record that traces back to 
the purchase of the phone and potentially beyond, makes a search of 
the digital device much more invasive than a search of a physical 
object.60 And finally, the Court concluded that the pervasiveness of 
modern cell phones, which most users now carry with them at all 
times, means that the privacy cost of allowing routine searches of cell 
phones is much greater than the cost of “allowing them to search a 
personal item or two in the occasional case.”61 
The Court went on to emphasize that highly sensitive records are 
now routinely stored on mobile phones, and that these records are 
“qualitatively different” from what would have been available during 
a physical search. The Court found that the highly sensitive data 
includes “Internet search and browsing history,” “[h]istoric location 
information,” “transaction records,” as well as data from a variety of 
new mobile “apps” that relate to private activities and interests.62 Cell 
phones contain such a wealth of data, the Court reasoned, that “a cell 
phone search would typically expose the government to far more than 
the most exhaustive search of a house.”63 Cell phones also provide 
access to sensitive personal information stored on remote servers, and 
law enforcement would have no clear way to distinguish between 
locally and remotely stored data.64 
 
 
 59.  Id. (“The sum of an individual’s private life can be reconstructed through a thousand 
photographs labeled with dates, locations, and descriptions; the same cannot be said of a 
photograph or two of loved ones tucked into a wallet.”). 
 60.  Id. 
 61.  Id. at 2490. 
 62.  Id. (“Mobile application software on a cell phone, or ‘apps,’ offer a range of tools for 
managing detailed information about all aspects of a person’s life. There are apps for 
Democratic Party news and Republican Party news; apps for alcohol, drug, and gambling 
addictions; apps for sharing prayer requests; apps for tracking pregnancy symptoms; apps for 
planning your budget; apps for every conceivable hobby or pastime; apps for improving your 
romantic life.”). 
 63.  Id. 
 64.  Id. at 2491. See also Brief of Amicus Curiae Electronic Privacy Information Center 
(EPIC) And Twenty-Four Technical Experts And Legal Scholars In Support Of Petitioner at 
12–14, 20, Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014) (Nos. 13-132, 12-212), 2014 WL 975497 at 
*12–14, 20 [hereinafter EPIC Amicus Brief]. 
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C.  General Warrants and the Broad View of Fourth Amendment 
Rights 
Before reaching its final conclusion, the Court considered the 
various “fallback” positions offered by the United States and 
California.65 The Court rejected these alternative standards because it 
found that they would impose no meaningful limitations on cell 
phone searches and would be impractical to administer. In this regard, 
the Court preferred to adopt a rule “done on a categorical basis—not 
in an ad hoc, case-by-case fashion by individual police officers.”66 
The Court concluded by addressing the likely impact of its 
decision and the importance of the underlying constitutional interest 
that it will serve.67 The Court acknowledged that its decision “will 
have an impact on the ability of law enforcement to combat crime,”68 
but also that, “[p]rivacy comes at a cost.”69 The warrant requirement is 
“not merely ‘an inconvenience to be somehow weighted against the 
claims of police efficiency.’”70 Rather, the Court recognized, the 
Fourth Amendment is a critical safeguard, “the founding generation’s 
response to the reviled ‘general warrants’ and ‘writs of assistance’ of 
the colonial era, which allowed British officers to rummage through 
homes in an unrestrained search for evidence of criminal activity.”71 
If there was any question about the breadth of the Court’s opinion 
in Riley, it was answered by the Court’s sweeping quotation of Boyd v. 
United States72 in the final paragraphs of the opinion.73 The Court 
noted that opposition to warrantless searches “was in fact one of the 
 
 65.  Id. at 2491–93. The United States proposed that the Court adopt the “Gant standard” 
and allow officers to search cell phones “whenever it is reasonable to believe that the phone 
contains evidence of the crime of arrest.” Id. at 2492. The United States alternatively proposed 
an officer should be allowed to search the phone when she “reasonably believes that 
information relevant to the crime, the arrestee’s identity, or officer safety will be discovered.” 
Id. And finally, the United States suggested that officers should at least be allowed to search an 
arrestee’s cell phone “call log.” Id. at 2492–93. California suggested “a different limiting 
principle, under which officers could search cell phone data if they could have obtained the 
same information in a pre-digital counterpart.” Id. at 2493. 
 66.  Id. at 2492 (quoting Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 705 n.19 (1981)). 
 67.  Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2493–94. 
 68.  Id. at 2493. 
 69.  Id. 
 70.  Id. (quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 481 (1971)). 
 71.  Id. at 2494. 
 72.  116 U.S. 616, 625 (1886) (quoting John Adams’s account of James Otis’s speech, 
“‘Then and there,’ said John Adams, ‘then and there was the first scene of the first act of 
opposition to the arbitrary claims of Great Britain. Then and there the child Independence was 
born’”). 
 73.  See Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2494. 
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driving forces behind the [American] Revolution,” and that John 
Adams had described a speech by James Otis decrying writs of 
assistance as “the first scene of the first act of opposition to the 
arbitrary claims of Great Britain. Then and there the child 
Independence was born.”74 The Court then emphasized that, “Modern 
cell phones are not just another technological convenience. With all 
they contain and all they may reveal, they hold for many Americans 
‘the privacies of life.’”75 The Court’s decision in Riley is based on a 
recognition that these digital devices are as deserving of protection as 
our homes and private spaces, if not more so. 
The Riley decision will have important implications for future 
Fourth Amendment cases, especially search-incident-to-arrest cases, 
electronic-search-and-seizure cases, and metadata cases. The effects of 
the Court’s decision will be immediate and most substantial in search-
incident-to-arrest cases, but could support significant doctrinal 
changes in electronic-search-and-seizure as well as metadata-
surveillance cases. In particular, Riley could influence the outcome of 
two major Fourth Amendment issues being considered by state and 
federal courts: whether (1) the collection of location records or (2) the 
bulk collection of call detail records constitute a “search” under the 
Fourth Amendment. 
II.  SEARCH-INCIDENT-TO-ARREST CASES POST-RILEY 
The Court’s decision in Riley will have the most obvious and 
immediate impact on future search-incident-to-arrest cases. Lower 
courts were previously divided over the question presented in Riley,76 
but now the Supreme Court has made clear that officers must obtain 
a warrant, absent exigent circumstances, prior to searching a cell 
phone that is seized during an arrest.77 However, there are still several 
related issues that lower courts will have to sort out in future cases.78 
First, lower courts will have to decide whether there are exigent 
circumstances that would justify an officer’s failure to obtain a 
warrant prior to searching an arrestee’s cell phone. Several of the 
 
 74.  Id. (quoting Boyd, 116 U.S. at 625). 
 75.  Id. at 2494–95 (quoting Boyd, 116 U.S. at 630). 
 76.  See cases cited supra notes 41–42. 
 77.  Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2493. 
 78.  This article will not discuss the application of the good faith exception in post-Riley 
cases. For a discussion of the good faith exception, see generally Susan Freiwald, The Davis 
Good Faith Rule and Getting Answers to the Questions Jones Left Open, 14 N.C. J. L. & TECH. 
341 (2013). 
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hypothetical concerns outlined by the State of California and the 
Solicitor General in their briefs before the Court might be reframed 
as exigent circumstances if they have a factual basis in a particular 
case. These include: threat of the destruction of data and risks to 
officer safety due to an arrestee’s communications with an 
accomplice. However, the Court was quick to dismiss these arguments 
in Riley due to their lack of factual basis, and there is currently no 
evidence showing that these concerns are present in real world cases. 
It would be difficult for an officer to establish some real threat of 
injury or loss of evidence in most cases. 
Second, lower courts will likely have to apply the Riley rule in 
search incident to arrest cases involving the seizure of computers and 
other electronic devices. This will be the most straightforward 
application of the Riley decision. The Court’s opinion made clear that 
modern phones are computers, and provided no basis to distinguish 
between different types of digital devices.79 The Court also explicitly 
adopted a categorical rule, rejecting the government’s proposal for a 
case-by-case approach to evaluating searches incident to arrest 
involving digital devices.80 And even before the Court issued its 
decision in Riley, lower courts had been treating cell phones and 
computers as indistinguishable for the purposes of the search-
incident-to-arrest analysis.81 Thus, any court considering a search 
incident to arrest involving a computer or other digital device will 
almost certainly apply the Riley categorical rule. 
Thirdly, lower courts will also likely consider the implications of 
Riley in cases involving exceptions to the warrant requirement that 
are similar, but not identical to, the search-incident-to-arrest 
exception. In particular, lower courts will have to decide how Riley 
impacts border search and seizure cases involving digital devices. 
Under the border search doctrine, as established by the Court in 
United States v. Ramsey,82 a warrant is typically not required for a 
search conducted at the border, and such searches have been deemed 
 
 79.  Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2489. 
 80.  Id. at 2491–92. 
 81.  See, e.g., United States v. Flores-Lopez, 670 F.3d 803, 805–06 (7th Cir. 2012) (“Judges 
are becoming aware that a computer (and remember that a modern cell phone is a computer) is 
not just another purse or address book.”); United States v. Phillips, 9 F. Supp. 3d 1130, 1141 
(E.D. Cal. Mar. 25, 2014) (“A modern cell phone is a computer . . . .” (quoting Wurie, 728 F.3d 
at 8)); Smallwood v. State, 113 So. 3d 724, 735 (2013) (“[T]he search of Smallwood's computer-
like device violated the Fourth Amendment.”)). 
 82.  United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606 (1977). 
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“reasonable simply by virtue of the fact that they occur at the 
border.”83 However, the Ninth Circuit recently held in United States v. 
Cotterman84 that a “forensic examination” of a digital device at the 
border requires reasonable suspicion.85 But some courts have not 
embraced this standard.86 The Court’s reasoning in Riley, that searches 
of digital devices implicate significant privacy interests, could provide 
a basis for lower courts to adopt the Cotterman rule in future border 
search cases. 
For example, in United States v. Saboonchi,87 the United States 
District Court for the District of Maryland considered the impact of 
the Riley decision on its earlier ruling on the scope of Fourth 
Amendment protections for cell phones and other devices at the 
border. In the earlier holding, the court adopted a Cotterman-like rule 
that “forensic” searches of cell phones and other devices at the border 
can only be conducted based on reasonable suspicion.88 The court’s 
definition of a “forensic search,”89 differed somewhat from the 
definition in Cotterman, but the rule it adopted was essentially the 
same. The defendant in Saboonchi moved for a reconsideration of 
that decision after Riley, arguing that the court should adopt a 
categorical warrant requirement for searches of cell phones at the 
border.90 The court in Saboonchi ruled that its “forensic search” rule 
was supported by the Court’s findings in Riley, about the increased 
privacy interests in digital data, but that the Riley decision did not 
overturn the “long history of the border search doctrine” cases that 
have declined to impose any standard higher than reasonable 
suspicion.91 This ruling is consistent with the view that the Court’s 
 
 83.  Id. at 616. 
 84.  United States v. Cotterman, 709 F.3d 952 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 85.  Id. at 967–68. 
 86.  See Abidor v. Napolitano, 990 F. Supp. 2d 260, 282 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (“I would agree 
with the Ninth Circuit that, if suspicionless forensic computer searches at the border threaten to 
become the norm, then some threshold showing of reasonable suspicion should be required. 
Now, however, ‘locking in a particular standard for searches would have a dangerous, chilling 
effect as officer’s often split-second assessments are second guessed.’”). 
 87.  United States v. Saboonchi, No. PWG–13–100, 2014 WL 3741141 (D. Md. Jul. 28, 
2014) [Saboonchi II]. 
 88.  United States v. Saboonchi, 990 F. Supp. 2d 536, 569 (D. Md. 2014). 
 89.  Id. (“I also do not define a forensic search in terms of the amount of data that is 
recovered, thereby leaving the status of a given search to be resolved later by Customs officers. 
Cf. Cotterman, 709 F.3d at 967. A forensic search is a different procedure, fundamentally, from a 
conventional search. It occurs when a computer expert creates a bitstream copy and it analyzes 
it by means of specialized software.”). 
 90.  Saboonchi II, 2014 WL 3741141 at *4. 
 91.  Id. 
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reasoning in Riley supports the adoption of a reasonable suspicion 
standard for forensic searches at the border, similar to the rule 
articulated by the Ninth Circuit in Cotterman. 
Finally, lower courts will face cases where searches incident to 
arrest lead to the seizure of unique physical objects and quasi-digital 
devices. The application of Riley in those cases could prove difficult. 
For example, the federal district court for the Northern District of 
Illinois recently analyzed the reasonableness of Drug Enforcement 
Agency (DEA) searches following an initial stop and seizure of the 
defendant’s vehicle in United States v. Correa.92 The court in Correa 
considered whether the recent Supreme Court decisions in United 
States v. Jones93 and Florida v. Jardines94 provided a basis to find that 
the use of seized garage door openers and keys to identify the 
defendant’s apartment was a “search” under the Fourth 
Amendment.95 
In Correa, the officers “discovered a bag on the front passenger 
seat” of the defendant’s vehicle “containing four garage door openers, 
three sets of keys, and four cell phones.”96 The officers subsequently 
drove through the surrounding neighborhood testing the garage door 
openers until one of the devices opened the garage of an apartment 
building.97 The officers then used the key fob from the bag to gain 
access to the lobby of the apartment building and tested the keys 
from the bag on various mailboxes until they found one that 
matched.98 The officers searched the apartment with the defendant’s 
consent, and discovered contraband and other evidence that was 
ultimately used to convict him.99 
In analyzing the defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence 
found in the apartment, the court considered whether the use of 
electronic garage door openers to identify the defendant’s apartment 
building constituted a search. In a prior decision (pre-Jardines), the 
court in Correa had denied the motion and found that the facts were 
 
 92.  United States v. Correa, No. 11-cr-0750, 2014 WL 1018236 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 14, 2014). 
The search of the defendant’s vehicle in Correa was technically a consent search, but the 
circumstances were similar to a search incident to arrest. 
 93.  132 S. Ct. 945 (2012). 
 94.  133 S. Ct. 1409 (2013). 
 95.  Correa, 2014 WL 1018236 at *3. 
 96.  Id. at *1. 
 97.  Id. 
 98.  Id. at *2. 
 99.  Id. 
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analogous to those considered by the Seventh Circuit in United States 
v. Concepcion.100 The officers in Concepcion used keys seized from the 
defendant to enter his apartment building and tested the keys on 
various doors until they found a match to his apartment.101 The court 
in Concepcion concluded that the use of the key to test the 
defendant’s apartment door was a “search,” but that “the privacy 
interest at issue was so small, the agents did not need a warrant (or 
even probable cause) to conduct the search.”102 The court in Correa 
rejected the defendant’s argument that the use of the garage door 
opener was meaningfully different from the use of the key in 
Concepcion or the use of other investigative techniques to identify the 
defendant’s apartment building.103 
The court specifically rejected the defendant’s argument in Correa 
that the use of the garage opener was equivalent to a digital 
“trespass,” which would make it a search under Jones and Jardines.104 
The court distinguished the facts in Correa from those cases on the 
grounds that the garage door opener had been lawfully seized 
incident to arrest, citing the Seventh Circuit’s recent cell phone search 
incident to arrest case.105 
In Correa’s case, even if [the DEA Agent] “searched” the garage 
door openers by pressing their buttons to see if they worked, he 
did so after lawfully seizing the garage door openers as evidence. 
For that reason, this case is much more like United States v. Flores–
Lopez . . . a case decided by the Seventh Circuit after Jones, and on 
facts more analogous to Correa’s case.106 
But the Supreme Court rejected that premise in Riley, finding that 
the categorical rule used by the Seventh Circuit and other courts was 
not valid in the context of digital devices.107 The question now is would 
Riley support a different outcome in cases like Correa? One portion 
of the Court’s opinion in Riley seems to indicate that it might. 
 
 100.  United States v. Correa, No. 11-cr-0750, 2013 WL 5663804, at *5–6 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 17, 
2013) (citing United States v. Concepcion, 942 F.2d 1170, 1172–73 (7th Cir. 1991)). 
 101.  Concepcion, 942 F.2d at 1171. 
 102.  Id. at 1173. 
 103.  Correa, 2014 WL 1018236 at *6. The court also noted in a footnote that although the 
defendant did not challenge the use of the electronic key fob to enter the apartment building, 
they saw “no real distinction between the use of a metal key and an electronic one.” Id. at *5 
n.1. 
 104.  Id. at *3. 
 105.  Id. 
 106.  Id. (citing United States v. Flores-Lopez, 670 F.3d 803 (7th Cir. 2012)). 
 107.  Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2491 (2014). 
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As the Court noted in Riley, the search of an arrestee’s cell phone 
is necessarily broader than the search of physical objects found on his 
person because cell phones now routinely provide access to remotely 
stored files.108 Allowing the officer to search remote files from the 
phone, the Court noted, would be “like finding a key in a suspect’s 
pocket and arguing that it allowed law enforcement to unlock and 
search a house.”109 Yet that is almost exactly what the lower courts 
allowed in Correa and Concepcion. The question for future courts will 
be whether the combination of Jones, Jardines, and Riley prohibits the 
use of electronic keys and other devices in ways that reach to the level 
of “trespass.” 
III.  THE IMPACT OF RILEY ON THE NSA METADATA CASES 
Perhaps the most interesting and controversial question raised 
after the Court’s decision in Riley is what impact, if any, the decision 
will have on pending challenges to the National Security Agency’s 
(NSA) bulk collection of telephone call records under section 215 of 
the USA PATRIOT Act110 (the metadata cases). Plaintiffs in the 
metadata cases have already argued that the Riley decision supports 
the adoption of a new Fourth Amendment rule governing the 
collection of call detail records and other metadata, including cell 
phone location data.111 The government’s primary argument in these 
cases has been that the collection of non-content information held by 
third party telephone providers is not a “search” under the Fourth 
Amendment, based on the Supreme Court’s ruling in Smith v. 
Maryland.112 Courts must now decide whether Smith, a case decided in 
the pre-digital era, provides a basis for rejecting privacy interests in 
phone and internet metadata in the present day. The Supreme Court’s 
decision in Riley did not directly address that question,113 but the 
Court’s reasoning provides strong support for a new approach to 
analyzing metadata searches under the Fourth Amendment. 
 
 108.  See id. (citing EPIC Amicus Brief, supra note 64, at 12–14, 20). 
 109. Id. 
 110.  Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to 
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-58, 2001, § 215, 115 Stat. 272, 
287–88 (2001) (codified at 50 U.S.C.A. § 1861). 
 111.  See, e.g., Appellant’s Opening Brief, Smith v. Obama, No. 14-35555, at 30–31 (9th Cir. 
filed Sept. 2, 2014). 
 112.  442 U.S. 735 (1979). 
 113.  See Riley, 134 S. Ct. 2473. 
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A.  The DOJ Argument in Favor of Bulk Metadata Collection 
There are three major cases arising from challenges to the NSA’s 
bulk collection of telephone metadata currently pending before 
federal appellate courts: Klayman v. Obama (D.C. Circuit),114 
American Civil Liberties Union v. Clapper (2nd Circuit),115 and Smith 
v. Obama (9th Circuit).116  The NSA Metadata Program, at issue in 
these cases, is conducted pursuant to orders by the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC).117 These FISC orders have 
been issued based on applications filed by the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI) for “Certain Tangible Things for Investigations to 
Protect Against International Terrorism.”118 
Under section 215 of the PATRIOT Act,119 the FBI may apply for 
an order for “the production of business records and tangible things” 
when it has “reasonable grounds to believe that the tangible things 
are relevant to an authorized investigation” to protect against 
international terrorism.120 The Business Record (BR) Orders issued by 
the FISC in the metadata cases require telephone companies to 
conduct “ongoing daily production to the [NSA] of certain call detail 
records or ‘telephony metadata’ in bulk.”121 Call detail records include 
the time, duration, and numbers dialed and received for every call, as 
well as other identifying and routing information.122 These FISC BR 
Orders have been issued to major telephone carriers on an ongoing 
basis since at least 2006.123 Plaintiffs in all three cases are Verizon 
 
 114.  No. 14-50005 (D.C. Cir. filed Jan. 9, 2014). 
 115.  No. 14-42 (2nd Cir. filed Jan. 6, 2014).  
 116.  No. 14-35555 (9th Cir. filed Jul. 1, 2014). 
 117.  See In re Application of the FBI for an Order Requiring the Production of Tangible 
Things from [REDACTED], No. BR 13-109, 2013 WL 5741573 (FISC Aug. 29, 2013) 
[hereinafter Eagan Opinion]. 
 118.  These applications are filed pursuant to 50 U.S.C.A. § 1861(a) (West 2014). 
 119.  Codified at 50 U.S.C.A § 1861 et seq. 
 120.  50 U.S.C.A. § 1861(b)(2)(A). The FBI can also seek an order for tangible things 
relevant to “obtain foreign intelligence information not concerning a United States person” or 
to protect against “clandestine intelligence activities.” Id. 
 121.  Eagan Opinion, supra note 117, at *1.  
 122.  As the FISC defines it, “telephony metadata” includes “comprehensive 
communications routing information, including but not limited to session identifying 
information (e.g., originating and terminating telephone number, International Mobile station 
Equipment Identity (IMEI) number, International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI) number, 
etc.), trunk identifier, telephone calling card numbers, and time and duration of call.” Id. at *2 
n.2. 
 123.  See, e.g., Eagan Opinion, supra note 117. In June of 2013, an unredacted BR Order was 
published by the Guardian, revealing that Verizon Business Network Services was a recipient of 
one of these BR Orders in 2013. See Glenn Greenwald, NSA Collecting Phone Records of 
Millions of Verizon Customers Daily, THE GUARDIAN (June 6, 2013), 
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customers124 who allege that their call detail records have been 
collected under this program in violation of their Fourth Amendment 
rights. 
In response, the Government has argued that (1) plaintiffs lack 
standing to challenge the bulk collection of domestic telephone 
records by the NSA, (2) federal district courts do not have the 
authority to override the FISC determination that the FBI 
applications satisfied the statutory requirements of 50 U.S.C. § 1861, 
and (3) the plaintiffs’ challenges are foreclosed by the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Smith v. Maryland.125 It is the last argument that is 
most likely to be impacted by the Court’s recent decision in Riley. 
The Government’s Fourth Amendment arguments are essentially 
the same in the three metadata cases126: collection of domestic call 
detail records pursuant to FISC BR Orders does not violate plaintiffs’ 
Fourth Amendment rights because (1) under Smith v. Maryland 
plaintiffs have no “reasonable expectation of privacy” in call data sent 
to a phone company; (2) the telephone metadata records collected by 
the NSA do not contain sensitive information; and (3) the post-
collection use limitations imposed by the FISC are sufficient to 
protect user privacy interests.127 But the Court’s decision in Riley 
undercuts all three of these arguments. 
 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/nsa-phone-records-verizon-court-order. Senator 
Diane Feinstein later confirmed that Verizon, AT&T, and Sprint have all received BR Orders 
on an ongoing basis since 2006. Dan Roberts & Spencer Ackerman, Senator Feinstein: NSA 
Phone Call Data Collection in Place ‘Since 2006’, THE GUARDIAN (June 6, 2013), 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/court-order-verizon-call-data-dianne-feinstein.   
 124.  The Plaintiffs in Klayman and Smith are Verizon Wireless customers, which 
complicates matters somewhat because the FISC BR Order disclosed last year was directed to 
Verizon Business Network Services, a subsidiary of Verizon Communications that was acquired 
during the 2006 acquisition of MCI. See Company Overview of Verizon Business Network 
Services, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, http://investing.businessweek.com/research/stocks/ 
private/snapshot.asp?privcapid=4259068 (last visited Jan. 20, 2015). The Government has 
already argued in the Smith case that the plaintiff cannot prove her metadata was collected. See 
Brief of the United States, Smith v. Obama, No. 14-35555, at 38 (9th Cir. filed Oct. 2, 2014) 
(“But there is no evidence in the record that the government has acquired metadata from 
Verizon Wireless under the Section 215 program, let alone that it would do so in the imminent 
future.”). 
 125.  See Brief for the Appellees, Smith v. Obama, No. 14-35555 (9th Cir. filed Oct. 2, 2014); 
Government Appellants’ Opening Brief, Klayman v. Obama, Nos. 14-4004, 14-5005, 14-5016, 
14-5017 (D.C. Cir. filed July 14, 2014); Brief for Defendants-Appellees, ACLU v. Clapper, No. 
14-42 (2nd Cir. filed Apr. 10, 2014), 2014 WL 1509706. 
 126.  See cases cited supra notes 115–117. All three briefs use the same structure (the 
language in the Smith brief is slightly different, but the substance is the same). 
 127.  See, e.g., Brief for Defendant-Appellees at 41–47, ACLU v. Clapper, No. 14-42 (2nd 
Cir. Filed Apr. 10, 2014), 2014 WL 1509706 at *41–47. 
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B.  Application of Riley in the Metadata Cases 
The Court in Riley did not directly address whether the collection 
of telephone metadata in bulk from a service provider would 
constitute a “search” under the Fourth Amendment. In fact, in the 
soon-to-be-infamous Footnote 1, the Court explicitly noted that it had 
not addressed that issue in Riley.128 But the Court’s reasoning may 
very well prove persuasive to lower courts deciding the metadata 
cases. In each of these cases the courts will consider (1) whether the 
“third party” rule established in Smith v. Maryland still applies in the 
context of modern telecommunications networks, (2) whether the 
type of metadata generated and collected today is sensitive enough to 
trigger increased privacy interests, and (3) whether post-collection 
rules limiting the use of collected metadata alter the Fourth 
Amendment analysis. 
1.  Smith v. Maryland, like Robinson, Could Be Overturned 
Because of Changes in Technology. 
Lower courts faced with this question may very well depart from 
the Smith v. Maryland doctrine based on changes in technology, using 
the same reasoning as the Court in Riley. The Court’s opinion made 
clear that digital communications devices implicate broader privacy 
interests than do physical objects and other traditional types of 
records.129 In particular, the Court found that data stored on cell 
phones is both quantitatively and qualitatively different from the 
types of physical objects found on an arrestee’s person.130 The Court 
also found that the pervasive use of modern cell phones implicates 
broader privacy interests because allowing access to that data would 
impact the privacy rights of all Americans.131 
Similarly, both the type and volume of communications records at 
issue in the metadata cases are fundamentally different from the pen 
register132 records at issue in Smith v. Maryland. In Smith, the Court 
considered whether law enforcement’s use of a device to record the 
numbers dialed on the defendant’s phone line without a warrant 
 
 128.  Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2489 n.1 (2014). 
 129.  Id. at 2491. 
 130.  Id. at 2489. 
 131.  Id. at 2490. 
 132.  The “pen register” used in Smith v. Maryland was a “mechanical device that records 
the numbers dialed on a telephone by monitoring the electrical impulses caused when the dial 
on the telephone is released. It does not overhear oral communications and does not indicate 
whether calls are actually completed.” Smith, 442 U.S. at 736 n.1. 
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violated his Fourth Amendment rights.133 The Court emphasized the 
“limited capabilities” of the pen register and the limited scope of what 
it could collect, which was a significant factor in determining whether 
the defendant had a legitimate expectation of privacy in that 
information.134 
Indeed, a law enforcement official could not even determine from 
the use of a pen register whether any conversation took place. These 
devices do not hear sound. They disclose only the telephone numbers 
that have been dialed—a means of establishing the connection. Pen 
registers in the 1970s did not disclose the purport of any 
communication between the caller and recipient, their identities, or 
even whether the call was completed.135 
The Court concluded that most individuals must be aware they 
“convey” the phone numbers they dial to the phone company, which 
may record logs of their calls for billing or other business purposes.136 
But the evolution of communications technologies since 1979 has 
dramatically expanded both the type of information collected about 
users by their service providers and the privacy interests at stake in 
the collection of that data.137 
2.  The Pen Registers Analyzed in Smith v. Maryland Collected a 
Very Limited Amount of Call Data 
In order to understand the difference between the call data 
currently collected by phone companies and the phone records at 
issue in Smith v. Maryland, it is helpful to unpack the Court’s accepted 
definition of pen register in 1979. The Court in Smith provided a 
definition of a pen register in its first footnote, relying on two prior 
opinions issued in 1977 and 1974.138 The first was United States v. New 
York Telephone Company,139 a case arising out of a telephone 
company’s refusal to provide a “leased line” to the FBI in order to 
facilitate the off-site monitoring of a target phone line via pen 
register.140 The telephone company argued that a pen register could 
 
 133.  Id. at 739. 
 134.  Id. at 741. 
 135.  Id. 
 136.  Id. at 742. 
 137.  See generally Brief of Amici Curiae Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) and 
Thirty-Three Technical Experts and Legal Scholars in Support of Appellant, Smith v. Obama, 
No. 14-35555 (9th Cir. filed on Sept. 9, 2014), 2014 WL 4678192. 
 138.  Smith, 442 U.S. at 736 n.1. 
 139.  United States v. N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159 (1977). 
 140.  Id. at 161–64. 
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only be authorized under a Title III Wiretap Order141 because the use 
of a pen register would involve “intercepting” wire communications.142 
The Court rejected this contention because it found that pen registers 
“disclose only the telephone numbers that have been dialed.”143 The 
Court emphasized that, “[n]either the purport of any communication 
between the caller and the recipient of the call, their identities, nor 
whether the call was even completed is disclosed by pen registers.”144 
The Court’s understanding of pen registers in Smith v. Maryland 
and New York Telephone Co. was derived from an earlier case, United 
States v. Giordano,145 a criminal wiretap case where the Court ruled 
that the evidence should be suppressed because the Attorney General 
did not properly execute the wiretap applications.146 Four justices147 
filed an opinion concurring in part, but dissenting regarding the 
suppression of evidence gathered using a pen register on the grounds 
that the use of a pen register device was “not governed by Title III.”148 
In Justice Powell’s dissenting opinion, he described a pen register as a 
device that “records on a paper tape all numbers dialed from” a target 
telephone line, but stressed that “[i]t does not identify the telephone 
numbers from which incoming calls originated, nor does it reveal 
whether any call, either incoming or outgoing, was completed.”149 
Justice Powell noted that the pen register device and its “mechanical 
complexities” had been described by the district court below.150 
 
 141.  Title III, which governs wiretapping and electronic surveillance, was first enacted as 
part of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2510–20 (West 
2014), and later modified by the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2701–
2710 (West 2014). Under Title III, certain federal and state agents may apply for an order 
authorizing the interception of wire or oral communications, and a judge may grant an 
interception order as provided in 18 U.S.C.A. § 2518. See generally WAYNE R. LAFAVE, 
JEROLD H. ISRAEL, & NANCY J. KING, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 4.2 (10th ed. 2000). 
 142.  N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. at 165–66. 
 143.  Id. at 167. 
 144.  Id. 
 145.  United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505 (1974). 
 146.  Id. at 533. 
 147.  Justice Powell, Chief Justice Berger, Justice Blackmun, and Justice Rehnquist. 
 148.  Giordano, 416 U.S. at 503–04 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 149.  Id. at 549 n.1 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Other lower court 
decisions also emphasize the fact that a pen register was not designed to detect whether or when 
a call had been completed. See, e.g., United States v. Caplan, 255 F. Supp. 805, 807 (E.D. Mich. 
1966) (“With reference to incoming calls, the pen register records only a dash for each ring of 
the telephone but does not identify the number from which the incoming call originated. The 
pen register cuts off after the number is dialed on outgoing calls and after the ringing is 
concluded on incoming calls without determining whether the call is completed or the receiver is 
answered.”). 
 150.  Id. (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The district court opinion is 
United States v. Focarile, 340 F. Supp. 1033 (D. Md. 1972). 
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As the lower court described, a pen register device at that time 
was nothing more than a “decoder” used to detect and translate the 
electronic tones that are generated by a phone during its dialing 
operation.151 When a number is dialed on a rotary dial phone, like the 
one used in the Giordano case, “a switch is opened and closed a 
corresponding number of times to the digit dialed which in turn 
interrupts the direct current on the line and causes the voltage of the 
electrical current to rise or fall the corresponding number of times.”152 
The pen register is installed on the phone line and “counts the 
number of pulses in the electrical energy caused by the changes in 
voltage, and causes the digit dialed on the telephone to be printed in 
Arabic numerals corresponding to the number of electric pulses.”153 
The mechanism for decoding touch-tone phone dialing was slightly 
more sophisticated, but the result was the same.154 
With that in mind, imagine the situation considered by the Court 
in Smith v. Maryland. Officers were called to investigate a robbery on 
March 5, 1976, and the victim provided a description of the robber 
and a vehicle seen near the scene of the crime.155 Police later spotted a 
man fitting the description driving a similar vehicle in the victim’s 
neighborhood and, based on the license plate, learned that the car was 
registered to the defendant.156 The police contacted the phone 
company and requested that a pen register be installed on the 
defendant’s home phone line.157 That same day, the pen register 
recorded a call made from the defendant to the victim; the defendant 
was later charged and convicted based on the phone call and other 
evidence.158 So the call log would have looked something like: 
(555) 555-5555 – dialed – (555) 556-5556 – 12:34:56 PM, March 17, 1976 
Plus similar entries for any other calls that were placed from the 
Defendant’s phone while the pen register device was installed. 
 
 151.  United States v. Focarile, 340 F. Supp. 1033, 1039–40 (D. Md. 1972). 
 152.  Id. at 1039. 
 153.  Id. 
 154.  See id. at 1040 (“In the case of a touch tone telephone, the press of a button on the face 
of the phone activates an electrical oscillator, which generates two alternating electrical currents 
at frequencies assigned by the telephone company to correspond to the particular button 
pushed. The TR-12 touch tone decoder detects these electrical currents at the varying 
frequencies and determines the arabic number to which the various combinations of frequencies 
of electrical current have previously been assigned by the telephone company.”).  
 155.  Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 737 (1979). 
 156.  Id. 
 157.  Id. 
 158.  Id. 
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But the experience of the officers in the Smith case bears no 
resemblance to that of NSA analysts reviewing the millions of 
telephone records that are collected each day under the Metadata 
Program. The pen-register data at issue in Smith was very limited— 
only showing dialed numbers and times without any ability to detect 
the duration (or even the existence of) a call. Given that background, 
the Court’s holding in Smith was based on a narrow set of factual 
circumstances that are not easily generalizable to new digital 
metadata records. But the Government now argues that the 1979 
holding authorizes the collection of any and all information shared 
with private companies.159 
3.  Modern Metadata is Different 
One key question in the metadata cases will be whether courts 
find that the NSA’s collection of metadata today is fundamentally 
different from the FBI’s use of pen registers in Smith v. Maryland. 
There are several factors that distinguish the NSA program from 
anything previously considered by the Supreme Court, but the most 
significant is the sheer volume of data. One expert estimates that the 
NSA Metadata Program could be generating “140 gigabytes of data” 
each day, the equivalent of “70 million pages of information every day, 
and about 25 billion pages of information every year.”160 This is only 
possible because of the exponential growth in digital storage and the 
sophistication of modern databases. Over the last thirty years, the 
capacity of computer storage has increased “at a compound annual 
growth rate (CAGR) of 60%.”161 
In 1976, the state-of-the-art 5 ¼ inch floppy disk drive had a 
capacity of 8,000 kilobytes and cost more than $500.162 Today 
companies produce memory products that can store 128 gigabytes of 
 
 159.  See, e.g., Brief for the Appellees, Smith v. Obama, No. 14-35555 at 37–60 (Oct. 2, 
2014). 
 160.  Declaration of Professor Ed Felten at ¶ 11, ACLU v. Clapper, No. 13-3994 (2nd Cir. 
filed Aug. 26, 2013) [hereinafter Felton Declaration], available at https://www.aclu.org/ 
files/pdfs/natsec/clapper/2013.08.26%20ACLU%20PI%20Brief%20-%20Declaration%20-
%20Felten.pdf (assuming 3 billion calls are made each day in the United States). 
 161.  E. Eleftheriou, R. Haas, J. Jelitto, M. Lantz, & H. Pozidis, Trends in Storage 
Technologies, INST. ELEC. & ELEC. ENG’RS. COMP. SOC’Y. TECHNICAL COMM. ON DATA ENG., 
Dec. 2010 at 1, avialable at http://sites.computer.org/debull/A10dec/ELE_Bulletin_Dec.pdf. 
 162.  In the Matter of Certain Double-Sided Floppy Disk Drives & Components Thereof at 
230–32, Inv. No. 337-TA-215, USITC Pub. 1860 (May. 1986), available at 
http://books.google.com/books?id=mW8aJDLjowsC&lpg=PA230&ots=QVZqm3c7-g&dq=1976 
%20shugart%20FDD&pg=PP1#v=onepage&q&f=false. 
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data on an eleven-by-ten-milimeter chip163 and hard drive disks that 
can store eight terabytes of data.164 That means a hard drive today 
could hold more than a million copies of the data stored on a 5 ¼ inch 
floppy disk.165 But even the exponential growth in digital storage rates 
has not been able to keep up with our ever-expanding demands for 
storage capacity. In 2007, the amount of information created and 
replicated surpassed the amount of storage capacity available, and 
analysts predict that we will see a fifty-fold increase in total data 
stored from the beginning of 2010 to the end of 2020.166 
The pen register records in Smith v. Maryland were physical 
files—paper records created by an automated machine—containing a 
very limited amount of information about calls placed from an 
individual telephone line. The records collected under the NSA 
Metadata Program are massive digital files containing comprehensive 
routing and call log information, including: date, time, target number, 
trunk identifier, number dialed/calling party number, device 
identification number, and duration of call (government officials 
claim that they do not currently collect cell site location information 
for mobile calls).167 These files contain data about millions of calls 
each day, not just the numbers dialed from a single target line. This 
metadata, like the cell phone data at issue in Riley, is both 
quantitatively and qualitatively different than the physical records at 
issue in Smith v. Maryland. 
Modern metadata is qualitatively different because it includes 
additional fields that provide sensitive information about the caller 
and the conversation. Firstly, metadata includes the duration of each 
incoming and outgoing call—information that the Court specifically 
noted was not present in Smith v. Maryland and the other pen register 
cases. The call duration data indicates whether a conversation 
 
 163.  See Press Release, Toshiba, Toshiba Offers World's Smallest-Class E-Mmc Embedded 
Nand Flash Memory Products (Oct. 1, 2014), http://www.toshiba.com/taec/news/press_releases/ 
2014/memy_14_725.jsp. 
 164.  Press Release, Segate, Seagate Ships World’s First 8TB Hard Drives (Aug. 26, 2014), 
http://www.seagate.com/about/newsroom/press-releases/Seagate-ships-worlds-first-8TB-hard-
drives-pr-master/. 
 165.  There are 1,073,741,824 kilobytes in a terabyte, so an eight terabyte hard drive is 
roughly 1,073,742 times the size of a 8,000 kilobyte floppy disk. 
 166.  JOHN GANTZ & DAVID REINSEL, THE DIGITAL UNIVERSE IN 2020: BIG DATA, 
BIGGER DIGITAL SHADOWS, AND BIGGEST GROWTH IN THE FAR EAST, Dec. 2012 at 3, 
available at http://www.emc.com/collateral/analyst-reports/idc-the-digital-universe-in-2020.pdf. 
 167.  See, e.g., Sample Call Detail w/ Cell Sites, VERIZON WIRELESS LAW ENFORCEMENT 
RESOURCE TEAM PRESENTATION at slide 23, available at http://cryptome.org/isp-spy/verizon-
spy.pdf (last visited Dec. 3, 2014). 
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occurred and can also be used to infer to some degree the nature of 
that conversation.168 Secondly, metadata includes the trunk identifier 
and other routing information that will reveal the general geographic 
origin of the call.169 This can reveal not only with whom the user is 
communicating, but also when and where they were located when that 
communication occurred. Finally, the metadata for wireless calls 
includes the unique identification number associated with the phone 
used.170 This unique identifier can be used to associate an individual 
user with a set of calls, as opposed to an entire household who would 
have typically shared a landline phone at the time the Court ruled in 
Smith v. Maryland. These differences alone are sufficient to alter the 
privacy analysis, but the aggregation of this data allows for much 
more invasive techniques. 
Modern metadata is also fundamentally different from printed call 
logs because of how it is collected and processed. Modern 
communications data is stored in structured datasets that facilitate 
sophisticated link analysis by data-mining programs.171 The 
combination of advanced processing capabilities with nearly limitless 
storage capacity and access to all the daily call records of major 
carriers allows for “new ways of exploiting the digital record.”172 
 
 168.  See also Jonathan Mayer & Patrick Mutcheler, Metaphone: The Sensitivity of 
Telephone Metadata, WEB POL’Y. (Mar. 12, 2014), http://webpolicy.org/2014/03/12/metaphone-
the-sensitivity-of-telephone-metadata/. 
 169.  See Patrick Di Justo, What the N.S.A. Wants to Know About Your Phone Calls, NEW 
YORKER (June 7, 2013), http://www.newyorker.com/tech/elements/what-the-n-s-a-wants-to-
know-about-your-phone-calls (“A cellular network is a ‘trunked’ system: rather than providing 
a direct radio link between two phones, callers are linked through a series of high-capacity 
channels, typically existing telephone circuits. The trunk identifier of a cell-phone call can reveal 
where that call entered the trunk system. This single piece of data can locate a phone within 
approximately a square kilometer.”). 
 170.  There are three different identification numbers that can be associated with a phone or 
other mobile communications device: IMEI, IMSI, and ESN. The International Mobile 
Equipment Identity (IMEI) “uniquely identifies an individual mobile station,” and consists of 
“a number of fields totaling 15 digits” with a “range of 0 to 9.” GSM ASS’N, IMEI ALLOCATION 
AND APPROVAL GUIDELINES 5 (v.6 2011), available at http://www.gsma.com/newsroom/wp-
content/uploads/2012/06/ts0660tacallocationprocessapproved.pdf. The Electronic Serial Number 
(ESN) is “a unique identification number embedded or inscribed on the microchip in a wireless 
phone by the manufacturer.” ESN Migration to MEIDs, TELECOMM’N INDUS. ASS’N,  
http://www.tiaonline.org/standards/numbering-resources/electronic-serial-numbers-esn-and-
meid (last visited Nov. 3, 2014). The International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI) is a “15-
digit identifier” that “has always been used by GSM systems” but has also been implemented on 
other cellular networks across the globe. David Crowe, Cellular Networking Perspectives, 
WIRELESS TELECOM MAG. (2001), available at http://www.cnp-
wireless.com/ArticleArchive/Wireless%20Telecom/2001Q1WT.html. 
 171.  Felton Declaration, supra note 160, at ¶¶ 20–29. 
 172.  Id. at ¶ 24. 
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Furthermore, the aggregation and bulk analysis of metadata poses 
special risks for privacy and associational rights.173 The government’s 
use of contact chaining174 and other relational analysis will necessarily 
expose private facts that would otherwise be very costly to obtain, and 
it will provide the government with easy access to that information 
about millions of innocent individuals who have never been suspected 
of wrongdoing. Government regulations are not sufficient to protect 
against such broad access. 
In Riley, the Court found that the privacy interests at stake in the 
search of a cell phone are heightened in part because of the volume of 
data stored—the aggregation of which could “convey far more than 
previously possible.”175 The Court also found that the type of data 
stored on cell phones, including call logs and historical location 
records, would reveal sensitive personal information about the user, 
and potentially provide access to a “comprehensive record of a 
person’s public movements that reflects a wealth of detail about her 
familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual associations.”176 
The Court also found that the pervasiveness of cell phone use means 
that allowing routine searches of cell phone data “is quite different 
from allowing them to search a personal item or two in the occasional 
case.”177 The Court repeatedly emphasized that the practical 
limitations of physical searches make them inherently different from 
the collection and analysis of digital data. This was the Court’s basis 
for departing from the well-established categorical rule from 
Robinson—the Court held that digital records are different from 
physical objects in the Fourth Amendment context. 
 
 
 
 173.  As the Court noted in Riley, “[t]he sum of an individual’s private life can be 
reconstructed through a thousand photographs labeled with dates, locations, and descriptions.” 
Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2489. 
 174.   The term “contact chaining” refers to the process of identifying and mapping everyone 
who is within two steps/hops of an individual of interest. See Vladis Krebs, Contact Chaining, 
The Network Thinkers (June 28, 2013), http://www.thenetworkthinkers.com/2013/06/contact-
chaining.html. For example, a contact chaining graph of Alice might show that she contacted 
Betty and Carl, and it might also show that Carl contacted David and Elaine and that Betty 
contacted Frank and Greg. In that scenario, Alice would be “two hops” from David, Elaine, 
Frank, and Greg. 
 175.  Id. 
 176.  Id. at 2490 (citing United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 955 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., 
concurring)). 
 177.  Id. 
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The same reasoning that led the Court to reject the application of 
the search-incident-to-arrest exception to cell phone data in Riley 
would support the rejection of the Smith v. Maryland rule for digital 
communications records. 
IV.  OTHER SIGNIFICANT FOURTH AMENDMENT AREAS THAT 
COULD BE IMPACTED BY RILEY 
The Court’s decision in Riley will likely have a lasting impact not 
only in search-incident-to-arrest cases and in cases challenging the 
NSA Metadata Program, but also in other major Fourth Amendment 
cases involving electronic storage and digital communications records. 
In particular, the Riley decision will guide lower courts in cases 
involving the collection of location data records and in cases involving 
the search and seizure of data in electronic storage. 
A.  Impact of Riley on Location Data Cases 
One significant unresolved issue is whether the collection of cell 
phone location data is a search subject to Fourth Amendment 
protections.178 Lower courts are currently split over the statutory and 
constitutional standards applicable to law enforcement requests for 
location data. And several federal appellate courts are currently 
considering this issue in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Jones.179 Those courts will now measure the impact of the Riley 
decision.180 
In 2005, a magistrate judge in the Eastern District of New York 
issued a rare published opinion following an application for a 
surveillance order.181 This opinion revealed for the first time that the 
 
 178.  See generally Stephanie K. Pell & Christopher Soghoian, Can You See Me Now?: 
Toward Reasonable Standards for Law Enforcement Access to Location Data That Congress 
Could Enact, 27 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 117 (2013) (discussing the constitutional implications of 
the collection of cell phone location data.). 
 179.  See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 754 F.3d. 1205 (11th Cir. 2014), reh’g granted, 573 Fed. 
Appx. 925, (11th Cir. 2014); United States v. Graham, No. 12-4659 (4th Cir. filed Aug. 22, 2012). 
 180.  See, e.g., Supplemental Brief of Appellants, United States v. Graham, No. 12-4659 (4th 
Cir. filed Jul. 18, 2014). 
 181.  See In re Application of the United States for an Order (1) Authorizing the Use of a 
Pen Register & a Trap & Trace Device & (2) Authorizing Release of Subscriber Info. &/or Cell 
Site Info., 384 F. Supp. 2d 562, 563 (E.D.N.Y. 2005). See generally Kevin Bankston, Only the 
DOJ Knows: The Secret Law of Electronic Surveillance, 41 U.S.F. L. Rev. 589, 608–12 (2007). 
The DEA had previously obtained real-time location information in a case where they obtained 
a Title III wiretap. See M. Wesley Clark, Cell Phones as Tracking Devices, VAL. U. L. REV. 
1413, 1415 (2007) (discussing United States v. Forest, 355 F.3d 942 (6th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 
543 U.S. 856 (2004)). 
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DOJ had been routinely seeking authorization to track cell phones in 
real time under section 2703(d) of Electronic Communications 
Privacy Act.182 The judge ruled that section 2703(d) could only 
authorize the compelled production of “information already in 
existence” at the time of the application, and could not authorize the 
ongoing or real-time tracking of a suspect.183 Courts have 
subsequently authorized the government to collect historical cell 
phone location data pursuant to section 2703(d),184 and at least one 
federal appellate court has ruled that this construction of the statute 
does not render it “categorically unconstitutional.”185 
At issue in the location data cases is the government’s collection 
of cell site location information (CSLI). As the Eleventh Circuit 
described in Davis, 
[t]hat location information includes a record of calls made by the 
providers’ customer, in this case Davis, and reveals which cell 
tower carried the call to or from the customer. The cell tower in 
use will normally be the cell tower closest to the customer. The cell 
site location information will also reflect the direction of the user 
from the tower. It is therefore possible to extrapolate the location 
of the cell phone user at the time and date reflected in the call 
record.186 
That location information is similar, but not identical to the data 
generated by the tracking device used in United States v. Jones. In 
Jones, the Supreme Court held that “the Government’s installation of 
a GPS device on a target’s vehicle, and its use of that device to 
monitor the vehicle’s movements, constitutes a ‘search’” under the 
Fourth Amendment.187 But the majority opinion in Jones ruled on the 
narrower grounds that the government’s physical occupation of the 
defendant’s “private property for the purpose of obtaining 
information” constituted a search, regardless of whether the 
 
 182.  Bankston, supra note 181, at 609. 
 183.  In re Application of the United States for an Order (1) Authorizing the Use of a Pen 
Register and a Trap and Trace Device, 396 F. Supp. 2d 294, 312–13 (E.D.N.Y. 2005). 
 184.  See Davis, 754 F.3d at 1210–11 (“The evidence at issue consists of records obtained 
from cell phone service providers pursuant to the Stored Communications Act (“SCA”), 18 
U.S.C. §§ 2703(c) and (d).”). 
 185.  In re Application of the United States, 724 F.3d 600, 615 (5th Cir. 2013). See also In re 
Application of the United States for an Order Directing a Provider of Elec. Commc’n Serv. to 
Disclose Records to Gov’t, 620 F.3d 304, 317–18 (3d Cir. 2010) (holding that a magistrate has 
discretion under section 2703(d) to require probable cause before issuing an order for location 
data, but that probable cause is not required under the Fourth Amendment in every case). 
 186.  Davis, 754 F.3d at 1210–11.  
 187.  United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949 (2012). 
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defendant had a “reasonable expectation of privacy” in his location 
information.188 The Court in Jones did not directly answer whether the 
collection of location data without the use of a physical tracking 
device is a “search” under the Fourth Amendment. But two 
concurring opinions—one by Justice Sotomayor and another by 
Justice Alito joined by three other justices—reasoned that the long-
term monitoring of an individual’s location would violate a 
reasonable expectation of privacy.189 
The state of Fourth Amendment protection for location data is 
still uncertain post-Jones, but the Court’s decision in Riley will likely 
have a significant impact on future decisions. Unlike Jones Court, the 
Riley Court spoke with one voice and clearly outlined the important 
privacy interests in cell phone data. The Court also specifically 
addressed the sensitivity of location data, invoking the reasoning of 
Justice Sotomayor’s far-reaching concurrence in Jones: 
Although the data stored on a cell phone is distinguished from 
physical records by quantity alone, certain types of data are also 
qualitatively different. . . . Historic location information is a 
standard feature on many smart phones and can reconstruct 
someone’s specific movements down to the minute, not only 
around town but also within a particular building.190 
The Court found that the privacy interest in location data, as well 
as other cell phone data, was so great that it outweighed the 
government’s interest in gathering evidence during a lawful arrest, 
overturning the categorical rule previously established in Robinson.191 
Defendants in future cases will argue that the Smith v. Maryland rule 
should be similarly rejected in the context of stored location data. 
And given the Court’s findings on the significant privacy interests at 
stake, it would be difficult for a lower court to conclude that an 
individual has no “reasonable expectation of privacy” in such sensitive 
data. 
 
 
 188.  Id. at 950. 
 189.  Id. at 956 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); id. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 190.  Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2495 (2014) (citing United States v. Jones, 132 S. 
Ct. 945, 955 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“GPS monitoring generates a precise, 
comprehensive record of a person's public movements that reflects a wealth of detail about her 
familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual associations.”)). 
 191.  Id. at 2493. 
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B.  Impact of Riley on Electronic Search and Seizure Cases 
In a growing number of cases, lower courts must grapple with the 
question of when and for how long law enforcement officers are 
allowed to collect, search, and store digital data.192 Determining the 
proper scope of digital data searches and the identifying reasonable 
retention and minimization practices for seized data is a complex 
problem; lower courts are likely to consider the Supreme Court’s 
analysis in Riley when ruling on electronic search issues. Among these 
issues, first: Is the copying of a digital device’s contents a seizure that 
triggers Fourth Amendment requirements? Second: Are there limits 
to how long law enforcement officers may store seized digital data—
i.e., do they have an obligation to delete the data? And finally, what is 
the reasonable scope of a digital data seizure or search—how does the 
“plain view” doctrine apply in the digital context? These are all 
questions that lower courts will have to answer in future cases; the 
Riley decision will likely inform those answers. In particular, Riley 
supports the conclusion that the retention of electronic data should be 
subject to different Fourth Amendment rules than those used for 
handling physical evidence.193 Riley would also support a narrower 
construction of the “plain view” exception for digital searches. 
Lower courts have not yet resolved whether law enforcement 
investigators have any obligations to delete or minimize seized data. 
Courts will have to address the scope of Fourth Amendment 
protections for seized data in cases where officers obtain a copy of a 
hard drive or other storage device in one case, and later attempt to 
use evidence gathered from that device in a separate case. For 
example, in United States v. Ganias,194 the Second Circuit considered 
“whether the Fourth Amendment permits officials executing a 
warrant for the seizure of particular data on a computer to seize and 
indefinitely retain every file on that computer for use in future 
criminal investigations.”195 The investigators in Ganias seized the 
defendant’s hard drives pursuant to a warrant in 2003 as part of an 
investigation into fraud by two government contractors for whom the 
defendant performed accounting work.196 By 2004, the investigators 
 
 192.  See generally Orin Kerr, Fourth Amendment Seizures of Computer Data, 119 YALE L. 
J. 700 (2010) (discussing recent decisions regarding law enforcement seizure of digital data.). 
 193.  Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2489–91. 
 194.  755 F.3d 125 (2d Cir. 2014). 
 195.  Id. at 137.  
 196.  Id. at 128. 
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had “isolated and extracted” files relevant to the contractor case, and 
pursuant to the warrant they were “not permitted to review any other 
computer records.”197 When the government subsequently expanded 
their investigation to include “possible tax violations by Ganias,” 
more than twenty months after the initial seizure of the hard drives, 
they were still maintaining copies of the non-relevant files from their 
previous search.198 
The court in Ganias ruled that the government’s “seizure and 
retention” of digital filed beyond the scope of their 2003 warrant was 
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.199 Specifically, the court 
found that “[w]ithout some independent basis for its retention of 
those documents in the interim, the Government clearly violated 
Ganias’s Fourth Amendment rights by retaining the files for a 
prolonged period of time and then using them in a future criminal 
investigation.”200 The court implied that while the government might 
be allowed to keep a mirror image of files for the purpose of 
maintaining its evidentiary chain of custody, there was no justification 
to use that data for “any other purpose.”201 The court’s ruling was 
clear: when the government obtains a warrant to search an electronic 
storage device for certain evidence, it must extract that evidence 
within a reasonable time period, then delete or otherwise prevent the 
use of all other data from the seized device. 
The rule adopted in Ganias is consistent with the scope of privacy 
interests in digital data outlined in Riley, and other courts will be 
more likely to adopt the rule in light of the Supreme Court’s decision. 
The Court emphasized in Riley that users have significant privacy 
interests in the files stored on their digital devices, and that searches 
of digital devices “would typically expose to the government far more 
than the most exhaustive search of a house.”202 Given the large 
volume of sensitive records stored on digital devices, it is necessary to 
establish clear limits on the retention and use of data seized pursuant 
to a warrant for a specific investigatory purpose. 
 
 
 
 197.  Id. at 129. 
 198.  Id. 
 199.  Id. at 137. 
 200.  Id. at 138. 
 201.  Id. at 139. 
 202.  Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2490 (2014) (emphasis in original). 
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As the search and seizure of stored electronic data has become 
commonplace in criminal investigations, lower courts have also had to 
address the application of the “plain view” doctrine to digital 
searches.203 The Supreme Court previously held in Arizona v. Hicks204 
and Horton v. California205 that “[i]f an article is already in plain view, 
neither its observation nor its seizure would involve any invasion of 
privacy.”206 But this rule is problematic when applied to seizures of 
digital data, as the Ninth Circuit recently discussed in United States v. 
Comprehensive Drug Testing (CDT).207 In CDT, the government 
argued that it could lawfully retain medical records outside the 
narrow scope of what it was authorized to obtain in the warrant 
because “that evidence was in plain view once government agents 
examined” the computer directory.208 The court in CDT rejected this 
argument because, under that theory, “everything the government 
chooses to seize will . . . automatically come into plain view. Because 
the government agents ultimately decide how much to actually take, 
this will create a powerful incentive for them to seize more rather 
than less . . . .”209 Furthermore, the court found that it would “render 
the carefully crafted safeguards” in the warrant “a nullity.”210 
In Comprehensive Drug Testing, the Government obtained a 
grand jury subpoena for all “drug testing records and specimens” held 
by CDT pertaining to their administration of Major League 
Baseball’s drug testing program.211 The company sought to quash the 
subpoena but the same day the motion was filed the government 
obtained a warrant to “search CDT’s facilities in Long Beach” that 
was “limited to the records of ten players as to whom the government 
 
 203.  See generally Orin Kerr, Searches and Seizures in a Digital World, 119 HARV. L. REV. 
531 (2005) (discussing the application of the plain view doctrine to searches of various digital 
mediums). 
 204.  480 U.S. 321 (1987). 
 205.  496 U.S. 128 (1990). 
 206.  Id. at 133 (1990) (citing Hicks, 480 U.S. at 325). As Professor Kerr points out, 
“[t]echnically speaking, the plain view doctrine is a limitation on the government’s right to seize 
evidence. It regulates seizures, not searches.” Kerr, Searches and Seizures, supra note 203, at 577 
n.200. Thus the plain view doctrine might not apply to “searches” of computer files at all if the 
court finds no seizure took place, but “no court that has applied the plain view exception to 
digital evidence has recognized or even acknowledged this point.” Id. 
 207.  United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 621 F.3d 1162, 1170–71 (9th Cir. 
2010) (en banc). 
 208.  Id. at 1170. 
 209.  Id. at 1171. 
 210.  Id. 
 211.  Id. at 1166. 
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had probable cause.”212 However, “[w]hen the warrant was 
executed . . . the government seized and promptly reviewed the drug 
testing records for hundreds of players in Major League Baseball 
(and a great many other people).”213 The players and CDT successfully 
moved for return of their property under Federal Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 41(g), and the government appealed.214 The court 
ultimately concluded that the Government had wrongfully accessed 
data beyond the scope of the original warrant and that, as a result of 
its intentional wrongdoing, it must return the property to CDT.215 
The Ninth Circuit’s decision in CDT and the Second Circuit’s 
recent decision in Ganias both show that the application of the plain 
view exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement 
should be narrowly construed in the context of seizures of digital data. 
As Professor Kerr has outlined, there are three main approaches to 
narrowing the plain view exception in the digital context: first, 
“narrow the plain view exception based on the circumstances of the 
search, such as the analyst’s subjective intent or the tool used;” 
second, narrow the exception based on the nature of the evidence 
discovered, permitting the use of some kinds of evidence while 
blocking others;” and third, abolish the plain view exception in digital 
evidence cases.”216 The court in Ganias adopted a version of the third 
approach, following along with the rule outlined by the Ninth Circuit 
in CDT.217 But recently some courts have declined to extend the same 
protections to data stored on digital devices that are seized pursuant 
to a warrant. 
For example, in United States v. Miller218 the court considered 
whether the forensic search of a digital camera that was seized during 
the lawful execution of a search warrant of the defendant’s home 
violated his Fourth Amendment rights.219 The officers in Miller 
obtained a warrant to search the defendant’s home for evidence 
related to suspected drug and narcotics sales.220 During the search, an 
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officer inspected a digital camera that was discovered in the 
defendant’s home.221 The officer turned on and “examined” the 
camera, discovering images that he believed to be child 
pornography.222 The police subsequently sought separate warrants to 
search the defendant’s house for evidence of child pornography based 
on the image discovered on the camera.223 The defendant argued that 
the detective’s examination of the camera was outside the scope of 
the warrant, but the court ultimately found that the examination was 
“consistent with an authorized narcotics search.”224 
The court in Miller rejected the defendant’s argument, made post-
Riley, that the search of a digital camera is “different” from the search 
of a photo album or other physical item that the police could lawfully 
inspect during the search of a home.225 The court distinguished Riley 
on the grounds that the search of a home pursuant to a warrant 
involves a “different mode of analysis” from a warrantless search 
incident to arrest.226 The court also reasoned that the search of a 
digital camera is different than the search of a smartphone because 
cameras only “contain a limited type of data, restricted to image and 
video files, that do not touch the breadth or depth of information that 
a cell phone’s data offers.”227 The court held that the search of the 
camera did not violate the defendant’s reasonable expectation of 
privacy because the police “inadvertently discovered Defendant’s 
child pornography,” and did not purposefully exceed the scope of the 
warrant.228 The court in Miller clearly adopted the “intent of the 
analyst” approach to the plain view doctrine in the context of a digital 
device seized during the search of a home.229 
These cases, which seem inconsistent upon first inspection, may in 
fact fit into a new framework of Fourth Amendment protection for 
digital data. When investigators obtain copies of digital data, as in 
Ganias and CDT, they will be subject to search and retention 
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restrictions based on the scope of the warrant or authorization. This is 
similar to the heightened standard imposed on “forensic” searches at 
the border in Cotterman and Saboonchi. However, when officers 
discover evidence upon initial inspection of a digital device during an 
authorized search, that evidence will be admissible even if it is outside 
the scope of the original search, so long as the discovery was 
inadvertent or reasonable under the circumstances. This rule would be 
necessarily limited because it would not extend to more in-depth 
forensic examinations of the digital devices. Any such examination 
would require an independent legal justification, similar to the 
“forensic search” standard applied by courts in the border search 
context. 
CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Riley will likely have a 
significant impact on future Fourth Amendment cases involving new 
technologies, especially cases involving cell phones and other digital 
devices. The first major test of post-Riley Fourth Amendment 
standards will likely come in the metadata cases, which are now 
pending before three federal appellate courts. Judges in the metadata 
cases could find that the “third party” rule articulated in Smith v. 
Maryland is inapplicable to modern communications metadata in the 
same way that the search-incident-to-arrest rule established for 
physical items in Robinson is now inapplicable to cell phones. 
Similarly, judges considering whether the collection of cell phone 
location information is a “search” could rely on the Court’s decision 
in Riley to support the conclusion that individuals have strong privacy 
interests in their location records. The Riley decision will likely also 
have an impact on border search and electronic search cases. Because 
of its potentially broad impact on future cases, the Riley decision will 
likely be remembered as a landmark decision for digital Fourth 
Amendment rights. 
 
